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Clerk, Supreme Court, Utah 
Mr. Geoffrey Butler, Clerk 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
322 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
RE: Salt Lake County v. Kennecott Corporation, 
Appeal No. 87-0047 
Dear Mr. Butler: 
On Thursday, the 24th day of May, 1990, I delivered to 
the Supreme Court a letter, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 
24J of the Rules of the Supreme Court. 
In that letter, I referenced a recent Supreme Court 
Decision but, through inadvertence, failed to attach a copy of 
that Decision with the letter. I am supplying herewith ten (10) 
copies of that Decision, and would request that you please place 
a copy of the Decision in each of the Judge's boxes, along with 
the letter heretofore delivered. 
I apologize for any inconvenience this may cause you. 
Thanking you in advance for your kind and courteous 
cooperation, I remain 
Very 
CINGHORN, 
hw 
Enclosure 
cc: James B. Lee, Esq. 
Maxwell W. Miller, Esq. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY BOARD OF EQUALIZATION OF 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, State of Utah, 
Petitioner, 
y. 
STATE TAX COMMISSION OF UTAH ex 
rel. Sunkist Service Company, 
Respondent. 
No. 870261 
FILED: March 19, 1990 
Original Proceeding in this Court 
ATTORNEYS: 
David E. Yocom, Bill Thomas Peters, Salt 
Lake City, for Salt Lake County 
David L. Wilkinson, Michael F. Skolnick, Salt 
Lake City, for State Tax Commission 
Philip C. Pugsley, Salt Lake City, for Sunkist 
Service Company 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
STEWART, Justice: 
This case is here on a petition filed by the 
Salt Lake County Board of Equalization to 
review an order of the Utah State Tax Com-
mission which held that real property belon-
ging to Sunkist Service Company was not 
subject to reassessment by Salt Lake County 
as an "escaped assessment" under Utah Code 
Ann. §59-5-17 (1974), even though a bui-
lding on the real property had not been incl-
uded in the assessment. 
The County's 1984 assessment notice for 
the subject property did not show any impr-
ovements on the property. However, a buil-
ding on the property was under construction 
and was 85 percent complete. That building 
was lawfully assessable in the 1984 property 
tax assessment. The 1984 owner of the subject 
property timely paid the 1984 taxes based on 
the underassessment. 
In 1985, the owner sold the property to 
Sunkist, and in purchasing the property, 
Sunkist, relying on the tax rolls, assumed that 
the 1984 taxes had been fully paid. 
In 1985, the County discovered that the 
building had not been included in the 1984 tax 
assessment. The County then assessed additi-
onal taxes under Utah Code Ann. §59-5-
17 (1974) (presently Utah Code Ann. §59-2-
309 (Supp. 1989)), which authorized counties 
to collect past taxes where property had 
escaped assessment. The additional taxes for 
the building amounted to $46,296.69. Sunkist 
protested the assessment to the State Tax 
Commission. The Commission ruled that the 
property had not escaped assessment, but had 
only been undervalued, and therefore could 
not be reassesssed. 
The issue is whether buildings not assessed 
in the tax assessment of the underlying land 
are considered to have escaped assessment or 
whether the entire property is considered to be 
undervalued. Section 59-5-17 allows the 
subsequent assessment of escaped property by 
providing: 
Any property discovered by the 
assessor to have escaped assessment 
may be assessed at any time as far 
back as five years prior to the time 
of discovery, and the assessor shall 
enter such assessments on the tax 
rolls in the hands of the county 
treasurer or elsewhere.... 
Utah Code Ann. §59-5-17 (1974). 
Our task is to define the term "escaped 
assessment," as used in §59-5-17. Since 
this is a legal question, we give no deference 
to the Commission's construction of the 
statute. County Bd. of Equalization of Salt 
Lake County v. Nupetco Assocs., 779 P.2d 
1138, 1139 (Utah 1989); Hurley v. Board of 
Review of the Indus. Comm'n, 767 P.2d 524, 
527 (Utah 1988). 
Sunkist argues that the relevant taxable 
property is one unit of property consisting of 
the dependent components of land and impr-
ovements. Under this view, the entire property 
was undervalued and hence is not subject to 
reassessment. In support of this position, 
Sunkist asserts that land and improvements 
are subject to only one tax lien and are not 
treated by the tax laws as independent types of 
property. See Utah Code Ann. §59-10-3 
(1974) (presently §59-2-1325 (Supp. 1989)). 
On the other hand, the County asserts that 
the land and the improvements are indepen-
dent units of property and that the assessment 
and taxation of only one does not preclude 
subsequent assessment and taxation of the 
other as an escaped assessment. The basis of 
the County's argument is the language in 
Utah Code Ann. §59-5-1 (Supp. 1985), 
which required that land and improvements be 
separately assessed. 
The question of whether unassessed impro-
vements on assessed real property may be 
reassessed has been addressed in other jurisd-
ictions. Some adopt the theory that Sunkist 
asserts here, that the land and the improvem-
ents thereon constitute one unit of taxable 
property. State v. Mortgage-Bond Co. of 
New York, 224 Ala. 406, 140 So. 365 (1932); 
Westward Look Dev't Corp. v. Department 
of Revenue, 138 Ariz. 88, 673 P.2d 26 (Ct. 
App. 1983); Whited v. Louisiana Tax 
Comm'n, 178 La. 877, 152 So. 552 (1934); Leyh 
v. Glass, 508 P.2d 259 (Okla. 1973). 
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Other states adopt the County's theory that 
land and improvements are independent types 
of property for reassessment purposes. Chew 
v. Board of Assessment Appeals, 673 P.2d 
1028 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983); Korash v. Mills, 
263 So. 2d 579 (Ha. 1972); People ex rel. 
McDonough v. Birtman Electric Co., 359 111. 
143, 194 N.E. 282 (1934); Mueller v. Mercer 
County, 60 N.W.2d 678 (N.D. 1953). Alaska 
has permitted reassessment when only some of 
the improvements were omitted from the ass-
essment. Municipality of Anchorage v. Alaska 
Distributors Co., 725 P.2d 692 (Alaska 1986). 
The general rule has been that "where a 
valid assessment has been made by an assessor 
cognizant of the facts, undervaluation is ord-
inarily not a ground for another assessment. * 
Builders Components Supply Co. v. Cockayne, 
22 Utah 2d 172, 173-74, 450 P.2d 97, 98 
(1969); see Union Portland Cement Co. v. 
Morgan County, 64 Utah 335, 230 P. 1020 
(1924). The Court recently reaffirmed this 
principle in County Board of Equalization of 
Salt Lake County v. Nupetco Associates, 779 
P.2d 1138 (Utah 1989), which held that an 
erroneous acreage figure on the assessment 
rolls resulted in an undervaluation of the 
property and not an escape from assessment. 
The Court did not allow the assessor to reas-
sess the property in light of the correct acreage 
figure. 
We first considered the issue of what the 
term "escaped assessment" means in Union 
Portland Cement Co. v. Morgan County, 64 
Utah 335, 230 P . 1020 (1924). There, the 
taxpayer failed to include several improvem-
ents in the statement which it transmitted to 
the assessor, and the property was assessed 
based on the erroneous description of the 
property. After the time for making regular 
assessments had elapsed, the assessor discov-
ered that certain improvements had not been 
included in the assessment. The Court relied 
on a predecessor provision to §59-5-17 and 
held that the assessor could reassess the pro-
perty. 64 Utah at 341-42, 230 P. at 1022-23 
(citing Comp. Laws Utah §5908 (1917)*). 
In Union Portland Cement, the omission of 
the improvements was the fault of the taxp-
ayer, while in the present case, the omission 
was the fault of the assessor. That distinction, 
however, is not material to the issue of 
whether the property had escaped assessment. 
Union Portland Cement is not inconsistent 
with §59-5-17, the escaped property statute 
that governs this case. Utah Code Ann. §59-
5-17 provides, "Any property discovered by 
the assessor to have escaped assessment may 
be assessed at any time as far back as five 
years prior to the time of discovery." The 
word "property" as used in §59-5-17 was 
defined in §59-3-1 (1974) (presently §59-
2-102 (Supp. 1989)): "Property means pro-
perty which is subject to assessment and tax-
ation according to its value ...." Improvements 
were independently subject to taxation and 
assessment as property according to the stat-
utory definition in §59-3-1. In 1983, §59-
5-1 provided, "Land and the improvements 
thereon must be separately assessed." In short, 
the tax statutes in effect recognized land and 
improvements as separate, or constituent, 
elements of real estate, each element being 
subject to assessment and taxation. 
In this case, the initial assessment for 1984 
had no description of the building. One having 
only a very general knowledge of the land 
would know from the face of the assessment 
notice that the building had not been assessed. 
Therefore, the building escaped assessment, 
and the County is not barred from assessing 
and taxing the building. 
The arguments made by Sunkist and relied 
upon by the Commission are not supported by 
the tax statutes. Rather, the statute Sunkist 
cites is further evidence that land and impro-
vements are separately taxed. See Utah Code 
Ann. §59-10-3 (1974) (presently §59-2-
1325 (Supp. 1989)). Section 59-10-3 speaks 
of property and improvements separately. 
Sunkist argues that it is inequitable to hold 
it responsible for taxes which accumulated 
prior to its ownership of the property and 
which were not assessed until after ownership 
was transferred to it, despite the long-
standing doctrine that property taxes are ass-
essed against the property, not the property 
owner. Sunkist also argues that because it 
relied on tax rolls which showed no delinquent 
taxes at the time Sunkist purchased the prop-
erty, the County should be estopped from 
collecting the escaped taxes. 
But the question is not one of estoppel or 
perceived inequity; it is, rather, one of statu-
tory construction. In any event, Sunkist had 
constructive notice that the building had not 
been assessed. The complete absence of any 
valuation for the building on the tax roll or 
assessment notice was clear notice to Sunkist 
that the building was subject to an escaped 
property assessment. It is not unreasonable to 
charge purchasers of real property with such 
notice as is provided by the separate listing of 
land and improvements on the tax rolls. 
Generally, if a separate assessment appears in 
the notice of assessment for both the land and 
for the improvements, a purchaser may rely 
on the assessment as being correct. Those 
assessments are not subject to correction by 
reassessment because they are not escaped 
properties. When Sunkist examined the tax 
rolls prior to purchase of the property, it 
should have noticed that no improvement was 
assessed and should have made appropriate 
inquiry. In addition to using available infor-
mation, buyers and sellers can easily avoid the 
risk of escaped property tax liability by a 
contract provision or deed covenant requiring 
a seller to assume such liability. 
Thus, for an improvement to qualify as an 
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escaped property rather than an underassessed 
property, the tax assessment notice must not 
list the improvement. If the improvement is 
underassessed but shown on the assessment 
notice, the statute prohibits the reassessment 
of the improvement. It was on that principle 
that Nupetco was decided. 779 P.2d 1138. In 
Nupetco, an assessment was made based on 
6.607 acres in the parcel rather than the 9.607 
acres that were actually in the parcel. The land 
was described incorrectly on the tax roll, but 
the Court held that the property had not 
escaped assessment. That is not this case. 
In this case, the building escaped assessment 
since it was not listed on the 1984 assessment 
notice. 
Reversed. 
WE CONCUR: 
Gordon R. Hail, Chief Justice 
Russell W. Bench, Court of Appeals Judge 
1. Section 5908 provided, "Any property discovered 
by the assessor to have escaped assessment may be 
assessed at any time, and when so assessed shall be 
reported by the assessor to the auditor, and the 
auditor shall charge the county treasurer with the 
taxes on such property, and the treasurer shall give 
notice to the party assessed therewith." 
HOWE, Associate Chief Justice: (Dissenting) 
I dissent. After reading and analyzing the 
cases on this subject, I conclude that the better-
reasoned cases support the rule that where the 
legislature has made no provision to protect 
good faith purchasers of real property from 
liability for back assessments on omitted 
improvements, the court will not interpret an 
"omitted or escaped property" statute, such as 
our Utah Code Ann. §59-5-17 (1974) (now 
Utah Code Ann. §59-2-309(1) (1989 
Supp.)), to allow the assessor to pick up 
omitted improvements-when the land on 
which they are affixed was on the tax rolls and 
the taxes originally assessed have been paid 
and the tax lien fully discharged. This rule was 
followed in Leyh v. Glass, 508 P.2d 259, 263 
(Okla. 1973), and in Westward Look Develo-
pment Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 138 
Ariz. 88, 90, 673 P.2d 26, 28 (Ariz. App. 
1983). 
In the Oklahoma case, the court correctly 
observed: 
In Oklahoma taxes upon real 
property constitute a lien upon the 
p r o p e r t y [ s t a t u t o r y c i t a t i o n 
omitted]. Parties dealing with real 
estate and titles thereto are charged 
with notice of the tax liens created 
by law. Akard v. Miller, 169 Okla. 
584, 37 P.2d 961. In cases such as 
the present case, the tax rolls would 
indicate that all taxes assessed 
against the property and improve-
UTAH 
ments had been paid for the years 
in question. If improvements cons-
titute omitted property within 
§2439 [authorizing county assessor 
to pick up escaped property], a 
purchaser for value might acquire 
the property believing that all taxes 
had been paid. The property might 
then be subjected to a lien for taxes 
for years prior to the date of purc-
hase due to the fact that certain 
improvements had not been assessed 
and taxed during prior years. The 
fact that the legislature failed to 
provide any protection for subseq-
uent purchasers indicates that the 
legislature did not intend to estab-
lish improvements as a separate 
class of real property which could 
constitute omitted property within 
§2439 in situations where the land 
itself had been assessed and taxed. 
The majority cites decisions from Colorado, 
Florida, North Dakota, and Illinois which 
hold that improvements upon land may con-
stitute escaped or omitted property even 
though the land itself has been assessed and 
taxed. Chew v. Board of Assessment Appeals, 
City and County of Denver, 673 P.2d 1028 
(Colo App. 1983); Korash v. Mills, 263 So. 2d 
579 (Fla. 1972); Mueller v. Mercer County, 60 
N.W.2d 678 (N.D. 1953); People ex rel. 
McDonough v. Birtman Electric Co., 359 111. 
143, 194 N.E. 282 (1934). However, in none 
of those cases had ownership of the property 
changed between the time of the payment of 
the taxes based on the original assessment and 
discharge of the lien and the later assessment 
of omitted improvements. Moreover, as obs-
erved by the Oklahoma court in Leyh v. Glass, 
508 P.2d at 263, in the majority of those 
cases the court noted that the statutory scheme 
provided that no charge could be made for 
years prior to the date of ownership of the 
person owning the property at the time the tax 
liability for omitted property was ascertained. 
Such statutory protection exists in at least two 
of the states: Illinois, People ex rel. McDon-
ough v. Birtman Electric Co., 359 111. at 148, 
194 N.E. at 284; and North Dakota, Mueller 
v. Mercer County, 60 N.W.2d at 681-82. 
Protection is also afforded in Kansas, Nicke-
lson v. Board of County Comm'rs of the 
County of Lyon, 209 Kan. 53, 58, 495 P.2d 
1015,1019(1972). 
The North Dakota decision rests primarily 
on a statute of that state which provides for 
the assessment of property which has escaped 
"in whole or in part." 60 N.W.2d at 681-82. 
We have no counterpart in Utah. The North 
Dakota court distinguished its statute from 
statutes in South Dakota and Minnesota which 
like Utah's authorize later assessment of "any 
property" which has escaped earlier assess-
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ment. In those two states, improvements, e.g., 
buildings, which were omitted may not be 
later assessed if the land to which they were 
affixed was on the tax rolls. Palmer v. Beadle 
County, 70 S.D. 99, 102, 15 N.W.2d 6, 7 
(1944); Davidson v. Franklin Ave, Inv. Co., 
129 Minn. 87, 89-90, 151 N.W. 537, 538 
(1915). Since Utah's statute, section 59-2-
309(1), is unlike North Dakota's, but like 
statutes in South Dakota and Minnesota, those 
cases are persuasive here. The Colorado Court 
of Appeals' decision in Chew v. Board of 
Assessment Appeals, City and County of 
Denver, 673 P.2d 1028 (Colo. App. 1983), 
relied upon by the majority, is unpersuasive 
since the court only stated its conclusion. Its 
opinion contains no analysis of the issue. 
In addition to the foregoing cases from 
Oklahoma, Arizona, South Dakota, and 
Minnesota, cases from Alabama and Louis-
iana support the rule that the assessor cannot 
make a subsequent assessment of improvem-
ents affixed to land when the land was on the 
tax rolls and the originally assessed taxes have 
been paid. Srate v. Mortgage-Bond Co. of 
New York, 224 Ala. 406, 408, 140 So. 365, 
367 (1932); Whited v. Louisiana Tax Comm'n, 
178 La. 877, 880, 152 So. 552, 553 (1934). 
I strongly disagree with the majority opinion 
that 
Sunkist had constructive notice that 
the building had not been assessed. 
The complete absence of any valu-
ation for the building on the tax 
roll or assessment notice was clear 
notice to Sunkist that the building 
was subject to an escaped property 
assessment. It is not unreasonable 
to charge purchasers of real prop-
erty with such notice as is provided 
by the separate listing of land and 
improvements on the tax rolls. 
Generally, if a separate assessment 
appears in the notice of assessment 
for both the land and for the imp-
rovements, a purchaser may rely on 
the assessment as being correct. 
Those assessments are not subject 
to cor rec t ion by reassessment 
because they are not escaped prop-
erties. When Sunkist examined the 
tax rolls prior to purchase of the 
property, it should have noticed 
that no improvement was assessed 
and should have made appropriate 
inquiry. In addition to using avail-
able information, buyers and sellers 
can easily avoid the risk of escaped 
property tax liability by a contract 
provision or deed covenant requi-
ring a seller to assume such liability. 
This statement is unrealistic. Sunkist did not 
have constructive notice that the building had 
not been assessed since there was nothing on 
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the tax rolls to show that any building was on 
the land on January 1, 1984. Only an inquiry 
extrinsic to the tax rolls would have revealed 
that. There is not "constructive notice" when 
an inquiry extrinsic to the public record is 
necessary. 
The realities of purchasing real property in 
this state are that the seller provides the buyer 
with a policy of title insurance. Since in Utah, 
as in Oklahoma and Arizona, property taxes 
are a lien against real property, the title 
insurer checks the records in the county trea-
surer's office to ascertain if there are any liens 
for delinquent taxes owing. If there are none, 
the insurer certifies to that effect. The title 
policy insures only against delinquent taxes 
which have been assessed but unpaid at the 
time the policy is issued. Undoubtedly in the 
instant case, Sunkist received such a title 
policy. However, if the county assessor is 
allowed to later make another assessment to 
pick up improvements which may have been 
omitted, a purchaser has no protection from 
his title insurer because those subsequent taxes 
had not been assessed and were not unpaid 
when the title policy was issued. 
The majority not only requires the purch-
aser or the title insurer to ascertain that there 
were no delinquent taxes owing, but also 
would require the purchaser or the title insurer 
to examine the records in the assessor's office 
as to whether both land and improvements 
had been assessed for the past five years. It 
would not be enough that the parcel of real 
estate with its legal description was on the tax 
rolls for those years. It takes little imagination 
to foresee the following problems in that 
procedure. 
First, it is the seller who customarily furni-
shes the title insurance and chooses the title 
insurer. It is not in his financial interest to go 
outside the tax records to ascertain whether 
there are grounds for a back assessment 
should the assessor discover those grounds. 
Second, if the buyer must inspect the asse-
ssment records, as the majority requires, the 
buyer will also need to make an extrinsic 
inquiry whether any buildings or improvem-
ents were on the land in any of the past five 
years, and if a building were constructed 
during that period of time, what the stage of 
construction was on January 1 of the year 
following the commencement of construction. 
From whom does the purchaser get that inf-
ormation? The seller may not know if he has 
not owned the property the entire five years. 
In the instant case, the majority holds that 
Sunkist had "constructive notice" that the 
1984 assessment was erroneous because no 
improvements were taxed. How was Sunkist to 
divine the percentage of completion of const-
ruction on January 1, 1984, almost two years 
before it purchased the property? Would the 
majority allow Sunkist to rely on the sellers' 
opinion or must Sunkist search out the 
ition v. State Tax Comm. 
idv. Rep. 3 
CODE • CO 
Provo, Utah 
County Board of Equalization v. State Tax Comm. 
130 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 
builder? The majority places no responsibility 
on the assessor in this process even though 
Utah Code Ann. §59-2-303(2) (1987) 
provides: 
Assessors shall become fully acqu-
ainted with all property in their 
respective counties, and, either in 
person or by deputy, regularly 
update assessment records in order 
to annually establish the values of 
the property they are required to 
assess. 
(Italics added.) Moreover, under section 59-2-
306, the assessor may require an affidavit 
from any person setting forth all the property 
owned by him or her. That apparently was not 
done here. Nor does the majority charge the 
assessor with "constructive notice" of the 
building permit on the public record for the 
new building. 
Third, even if a buyer buys vacant land, the 
majority would charge him with the duty to 
ascertain by extrinsic inquiry whether at any 
time within the past five years there were 
buildings or parts of buildings on the property 
which were not assessed and have since been 
demolished. 
In sum, the burden placed by the majority 
on purchasers of real property is fraught with 
mischief and very unrealistic. The buyer must 
now decide whether to spend the money nec-
essary to make the inquiry extrinsic to the 
county tax records or whether to "take his 
chances." The suggestion of the majority that 
buyers and sellers "can easily avoid" the risk 
of a later assessment by providing by contract 
or deed covenant that the seller will assume 
such liability is again unsatisfactory. Once the 
sale has closed, the funds are disbursed to the 
seller, and the buyer takes possession, the 
seller often leaves the state. If he does not 
leave, a lawsuit may be necessary to collect, 
which in some cases may be a small amount 
such as the taxes on a residence for one year. 
As a practical matter, the buyer will wind up 
absorbing the loss rather than engage in litig-
ation. As was observed by the Supreme Court 
of Alabama in its opinion in State v. Mortg-
ageBond Co. of New York, 224 Ala. 406, 409, 
140 So. 365, 368 (1932), "The public good 
requires security of titles as well as just taxa-
tion and the law aims at both." Good faith 
purchasers should be entitled to rely on the tax 
records. 
The majority finds support for its position 
in the fact that in Utah, by statute, land and 
any improvements thereon are separately ass-
essed. I disagree that that fact makes any 
difference. Several courts which subscribe to 
the rule which I advocate have held that the 
separate assessment is simply to aid the taxp-
ayer and the assessor in arriving at a fair 
evaluation of the land and improvements. It 
does not make improvements a separate class 
of property. Palmer v. Beadle Countyy 70 
S.D. at 102, 15 N.W.2d at 7; State v. Mort-
gage-Bond Co. of New York, 224 Ala. at 
409, 240 So. at 368; Leyh v. Glass, 508 P.2d 
at 263. Taxpayers have the right to protest 
what they consider an overvaluation. Since 
land and improvements are appraised by dif-
ferent methods and standards, both the asse-
ssor and the taxpayer are assisted by separate 
assessments. However, once the assessment 
has been made, the tax rolls are sent to the 
county treasurer for the application of the mill 
levy to the total assessment. There, taxes are 
computed on the combined value of the land 
and improvements; one lump sum results. If a 
partial payment is made, that payment is 
applied on the total taxes without any break-
down between land and improvements. If the 
taxes are not paid, eventually the county sells 
the land and improvements together without 
any breakdown. There is but one lien on the 
property for the taxes owing on the combined 
assessed values of land and improvements. 
Clearly, the separate assessment of land and 
improvements does not support the majority*s 
position. 
I also disagree with the majority that there 
is comfort for its position in Union Portland 
Cement Co. v. Morgan County, 64 Utah 335, 
230 P. 1020 (1924). The majority has failed to 
point out that in that case, there was no 
change of ownership as in the instant case. 
Furthermore, the taxpayer had furnished the 
assessor with either a false or an obviously 
incomplete statement of the improvements on 
the property, and the omission was discovered 
before the taxpayer paid his taxes for that 
year. I have no quarrel with that decision, but 
it is obvious that the facts are unlike those we 
are confronted with here. It is true that in that 
case we stated that the reason the property 
was omitted was immaterial and that if prop-
erty were omitted, it was the duty of the ass-
essor to assess it. Since this Court did not 
have before it a fact situation anything like the 
facts with which we are now confronted, the dic-
ta in Union Portland cannot be considered 
to be authority for this more complex situa-
tion. 
I would affirm the Utah Tax Commission. 
Durham, Justice, concurs in the 
dissenting opinion of Associate Chief Justice 
Howe. 
Zimmerman, Justice, having 
disqualified himself, does not participate 
herein; Bench, Court of Appeals Judge, sat. 
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